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Abstract
Housing constitutes a large amount of all economic activity and plays a signiﬁ-
cant role for the business cycle, and is of great importance for monetary policy. How
central banks should approach diﬀerent housing variables is contended. This thesis
considers two variables, house prices and residential investment, and how they are
of interest for monetary policy makers.
House prices are diﬃcult to include in inﬂation indices, and their developments
are accordingly hard to respond to when conducting inﬂation targeting monetary
policy. Furtermore, they are commonly associated with ﬁnancial imbalances, but
the exact role they play in this respect is a contended issue. House prices are found
to be dealt with in varying ways among central banks, as there is a lack of consensus
on the way to approach them.
Residential investment is shown to play a signiﬁcant role for the U.S. business
cycle by Leamer (2007). Following his analysis, I consider its importance for re-
cessions of 17 other OECD countries. I ﬁnd that, while its role is less prominent
than for the U.S., residential investment contains useful information about economic
turmoil, and could potentially be used as a target variable for central banks in their
pursuit to stabilize the business cycle.
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1 Introduction
Housing is of great importance to monetary policy. It constitutes a large amount of all
economic activity, and its role with respect to recessions has received renewed attention
following the bursting of the U.S. housing bubble. Central banks are particularly inter-
ested in housing, both because of its role as a major consumption expenditure, but also
because of the part it plays in relation to ﬁnancial instability. House prices, the most
monitored housing variable, is of interest in both of these respects. House prices are a
nominal variable, however, and as such more easily subject to speculation and subsequent
bubble formation. It could be that a variable more closely associated with the real econ-
omy includes additional information not contained in house prices. Residential investment
is such a variable, mirroring economic activity linked directly to the real economy. It is
an intriguing possibility that monitoring residential investment might reveal more infor-
mation about the business cycle.
In recent decades, many central banks have adopted price stability targets, aiming to
keep inﬂation low and stable. In order to conduct good monetary policy, it is thus of
the highest importance to know the current price development. As a consequence, the
way in which one measures inﬂation becomes of high relevance. One of the challenges
with measuring inﬂation is how to deal with house prices. The Consumer Price Index
(CPI) is a cost-of-living index, often used as a price stability indicator, which seeks to
measure the development of prices of goods and services purchased by a representative
consumer. House prices are of great importance for consumers' purchasing decisions, and
should therefore be considered when making such an estimation. However, owner occu-
pied housing has certain properties that distinguishes it from other goods and services in
the index, and its pricing is not included in a straightforward manner. Diﬀerent indices
use diﬀerent methods to handle the issue, but they are ﬂawed in various ways. In fact,
some indices exclude house prices altogether. The ramiﬁcations of the issue are unclear,
but are surely something to consider.
A related discussion is the implication these diﬃculties carry for monetary policy. Al-
though the CPI is a commonly used indicator of price stability, there is a question of
whether it is optimal for this purpose. Critics claim that the fundamentals of the CPI
are in conﬂict with an ideal price stability indicator, and that one should generally base
monetary policy on a diﬀerent indicator. The importance of owner-occupied housing and
its properties as a commodity plays directly into this discussion. The need for such a
debate has become prominent in recent years. Cobham (2013) discusses the way three
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central banks (the Fed, BoE and ECB) viewed house prices in the run up to the ﬁnancial
crisis of 2007-2008. He ﬁnds that the Fed and the BoE did not put in a suﬃcient eﬀort
to study the development of house prices, because they were commited to the view that
monetary policy should not respond to asset prices. For the case of the ECB, Cobham
(2013) ﬁnds that, although being aware of irregularities in the house prices, their mone-
tary policy response to them is hard to establish.
Complicating the matter even further, developments in house prices not only con-
tribute to inﬂation, but are also sometimes considered as signs of ﬁnancial instabilities.
As such, the question of how to handle house price developments is not only a question of
how they aﬀect price stability, but also whether they can signalize a build-up of ﬁnancial
instabilities, which in turn entails instability of prices and output. That is, there is a
question of whether house prices and other housing variables should be (i) treated on a
day-to-day basis as part of a general business cycle indicator, (ii) be considered in the
context of asset bubbles and potential ﬁnancial crises, or (iii) be considered as both a
business cycle indicator and a more long term indicator of ﬁnancial imbalances. There is
no consensus on the matter as of yet, but there are many opinions.
Residential investment is another interesting variable in relation to monetary policy.
The intertemporal nature of residential investment makes the interaction with monetary
policy complicated, as changes in the interest rate may alter the value of a project after
an investment decision has been made. Furthermore, accounting for a large amount of
the housing sector, the building of new homes is closely intertwined with the development
of housing bubbles and ﬁnancial instabilities. As house prices rise, so does the proﬁtabil-
ity of new house projects. The connection between housing bubbles and recessions thus
makes residential investment especially interesting to study for monetary policy makers.
There is a compelling possibility that residential investment could be leading recessions.
In a much cited paper, Leamer (2007) argues that it is residential investment, rather than
house prices, that drives the business cycle. If this is the case, central banks could hope
to better control the business cycle by stabilizing the cycle of housing starts.
In the thesis I look at what role certain housing variables should play when conducting
monetary policy. My approach is twofold. First, in section 2, I will look at the interaction
between inﬂation, house prices and monetary policy. I will consider both the challenge of
including house prices in a price indicator and whether house prices should be considered
part of the price stability target of the central bank. Additionally, I will discuss the his-
torical views as well as more recent theories, in particular in light of developments in the
past decade. Second, in section 3, I will conduct an empirical analysis, focusing on how
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residential investment may play a role as a business cycle indicator. I will replicate and
expand on the analysis of Leamer (2007), as well as performing a similar analysis on 17
additional OECD countries.
In my review of house prices and monetary policy, I ﬁnd that, although the problem
of implementing house prices appropriately in the conduct monetary policy is receiving
much attention, there is no consensus on the matter as of yet. Price indices vary in how
they include housing costs, and the diﬀerent approaches yield varying inﬂation estimates.
The diﬀerent estimates can imply diﬀerent monetary policy responses. Furthermore, how
to approach house prices in the context of ﬁnancial imbalances is uncertain, but most cen-
tral banks monitor developments in house prices, considering them a potential indicator
of ﬁnancial instability.
In my empirical analysis, I ﬁnd evidence that residential investment is a variable of
interest for monetary policy. There are signs that it, in many cases, could be leading
recessions, serving as a driver of the business cycle. As documented by Leamer (2007), it
seems to be of particular importance for the U.S. business cycle. However, it is also an
interesting variable for other OECD countries.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 looks at the relation
between house prices and monetary policy. Section 2.1 outlines stylized facts on inﬂation,
house prices and monetary policy. Section 2.2 looks at how inﬂation should be measured,
with a particular emphasis on the challenge of measuring house price developments. Sec-
tion 2.3 evaluates how central banks should approach the diﬃculties associated with house
prices. Section 3 contains the empirical analysis of the role of residential investment in
relation to recessions. Section 3.1 outlines stylized facts on residential investment. Sec-
tion 3.2 introduces the data used in the analysis. Section 3.3 presents the method used
to conduct the analysis. Section 3.4 shows the replication of the U.S. results as well as
supplementing it with new data. Section 3.5 presents the results for the 17 other OECD
countries. Finally, section 4 concludes the thesis.
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2 House prices and monetary policy
House prices are of particular interest in relation to monetary policy. Housing costs are
a signiﬁcant part of most people's spending. As such, their price developments should
be included in a price index measuring changes in consumption costs. However, hous-
ing is a durable good which can be sold for ﬁnancial gain after use, giving it asset-like
properties. As assets traditionally are not included in price indices measuring changes in
consumption costs, this gives rise to a problem of disentangling the investment part from
the consumption part of a house purchase. How this issue is dealt with carries implica-
tions for inﬂation targeting central banks, who rely on having accurate inﬂation estimates
when conducting monetary policy. Furthermore, excessive growth in house prices can lead
to ﬁnancial imbalances in the form of a housing bubble, which could, in the worst case,
initiate a recession when bursting. This gives further reason for central banks to monitor
and possibly try to aﬀect developments in house prices.
In the ﬁrst section of the thesis, I will look at challenges posed by house prices for
monetary policy. First, I outline some stylized facts on the relationship between inﬂation,
house prices and monetary policy. Second, in section 2.2, I take a general look at the
problem of measuring inﬂation, and in section 2.2.1 I discuss the diﬃculty of including
house prices in a measurement of inﬂation. Finally, in section 2.3, I review the consid-
erations central banks must take when facing house prices, and in section 2.3.1 I look at
how some central banks currently deal with house prices.
2.1 Stylized facts
To help motivate this part of the thesis, I brieﬂy discuss the observed relationship between
inﬂation, house prices, and monetary policy. Many have attributed the low interest rate
of the early 2000s and the ensuing U.S. housing bubble as a major contributing factor to
the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-2009. The years since the crisis have been characterised by low
interest rates all over the world, and countries where a possible bubble has yet to burst
are watchful. Governor Mark Carney of the Bank of England stated in July 2014 that
"The Bank is well aware that a prolonged period of historically low interest rates could
encourage other risks to develop" and "In the U.K., the biggest risks are associated with
the housing market."2 The consequences of asset price bubbles are both known and dire,
and examples like the bursting of the Japanese asset bubble and the country's subsequent
2http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ﬁnance/economics/10985991/Mark-Carney-rates-must-rise-to-avoid-
housing-bubble.html
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economic stagnation quickly jump to the minds of monetary policy makers.
In Norway, following the national banking crisis of the early 90s, a concerning situation
has developed, with house prices diverging greatly from the CPI. Figure 1 illustrates this
point graphically: By 2014, nominal house prices were almost 8 times as high as in 1982,
whereas the CPI only tripled in size since then. Figure 2 shows the annual growth rates of
house prices and CPI, as well as the overnight lending rate oﬀered by Norges Bank. While
the lending rate seems to be quite correlated with the CPI, it is diﬃcult to establish the
same relationship with the house prices.3 As central banks have a special interest in price
stability, this apparent discrepancy between house prices, general inﬂation and monetary
policy gives reason to investigate this relationship further.
Figure 1: Cumulative increase in Norwegian
house prices and CPI 1982-2014
Figure 2: House prices, CPI and overnight
lendring rate 1982-2014
2.2 Measuring inﬂation
The properties of a well constructed price index will depend on its intended use. Alchian
& Klein (1973) state that "A well recognized principle is that the appropriateness of a
price index depends on the question to which an answer is sought." and reference, among
others, Frisch (1915) and Keynes (1923). The theoretical foundation of what a cost-of-
living index should be, and how it ought to be constructed, is thoroughly discussed by
Pollak (1998). He points out that, in the end, a cost-of-living index will rest on unrealistic
assumptions, and that with both signiﬁcant theoretical and empirical uncertainties, one
should be cautious whenever modifying the CPI, to avoid weakening its credibility.
There are several challenges to overcome in order to construct an ideal price index in
order to measure inﬂation. While the purpose, to measure the average price change of
3Data from Norges Bank and Statistics Norway.
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some bundle of goods and services from one period to the next, is quite intuitive, there are
both theoretical and practical issues to address in order to arrive at this goal. First, one
must make a choice of how to calculate the index, as there are diﬀerent approaches to the
matter. How to weigh the importance of diﬀerent components in the bundle is another
concern. If trying to create a cost of living index, like the CPI, one must ﬁgure out what
such a bundle should look like at a given time; as people's consumption behavior changes,
so should the bundle. Actual price data must be collected, which can be a costly process.
For these reasons, national statistical institutes all over the world dedicate a large amount
of their resources to producing price indices.
When discussing inﬂation indices, the CPI is of particular interest. It is likely the
most known price index, and serves as an important indicator of expected inﬂation in e.g.
wage negotiations, ﬁrms' project analysis etc. It is also the index most inﬂation targeting
central banks rely on as a price stability measure, although it primarily is intended to
serve as a cost-of-living index. Cost-of-living indices like the CPI exclude asset prices
because investment is considered saving, while the CPI only seeks to measure changes in
consumption goods and services. Similarly, intermediate good and raw material prices
are excluded as they are not used by the consumer directly for his or her own needs.
There are objections as to whether the CPI manages to properly depict developments
in costs of living. A common criticism is that it does not deal with improvement of quality
in goods in a satisfactory manner, that it fails to include new goods in a good way, and
that it is inaccurate in accounting for substitution between goods (for example changing
habits, complementary eﬀects from new goods etc.). If this criticism holds, one would
expect the CPI to systematically overestimate the cost of living. Complicating the issue
even further are counterarguments to an upward bias of the CPI, for example that some
goods may disappear and that quality may deteriorate, or even the exclusion of certain
goods, implying a negative bias in the CPI (Røed Larsen 2004).
Costs related to housing are a signiﬁcant part of most people's spending. In spite
of this, whether to include housing costs in price indices, and how to do it, remains a
debated issue. The problem can be summarized as follows. Consumer price indices are
constructed to measure the development of costs of goods and services consumed by the
public. The development of asset prices are not considered. A much used argument for not
including house prices in price indices is that the purchase of a house is predominantly
an investment, i.e. an asset purchase, and should as such not be included in inﬂation
measurements. Although living in a domicile delivers a stream of services whose price
development should be accounted for in a cost-of-living index, owning a house will have
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similar properties as owning any other asset. An owned domicile is a durable good which
can be resold in the future, and should in that respect be considered an investment. The
challenge in measuring the development of house prices as part of a broader consumer
price index, lies in disentangling the investment part from the consumption part of a house
purchase. Not including housing in the CPI, but replacing it with rent, could serve as a
proxy in an attempt to solve this problem. Whether this is a good solution is contended.
In section 2.2.1 I discuss approaches to include housing in an inﬂation index.
2.2.1 The challenge of measuring house prices in an inﬂation index
As house prices have the characteristics of both a consumption good as well as an in-
vestment, including them in an inﬂation index is not trivial. If the inﬂation index is a
cost of living index, like the CPI, asset prices should not be included. There are several
approaches to dealing with this problem. In this section I present some of them.
First, the most rudimentary one is what is known as the net-acquisition approach.
It simply treats housing as any other good in the price index. The shortcoming of this
method is that it does not take into account the diﬀerent nature of housing consumption
compared to consumption of other goods. The durability of the housing good implies a
consumption spread over time, which is overlooked. Furthermore, it does not address the
asset property of user-owned accommodation. The degree to which housing is considered
an investment, expected to yield a return in some future period, should not be viewed as
a cost of living.
Second, a well-known, and much used, method (for instance in the construction of both
the American and the Norwegian CPI) is the rental equivalence approach. This approach
makes the assumption that the relation between the value of the service stream oﬀered
by owner-occupied housing (that is, the share of a housing purchase not considered an
investment) and rental prices is the same in the long run.4 Rental prices are used to make
an estimate of owner-occupied housing's contribution to inﬂation (i.e. the changes in
house prices that are not considered asset price ﬂuctuations), making use of the assumed
relationship between the prices. While this method is very appealing in theory, it faces
some rather severe practical complications. First, there is often a big diﬀerence between
housing available at the rental market and owner-occupied housing. Certain dwellings are
rarely rented out, and a challenging statistical estimate correcting for these diﬀerences
must be performed. If the rental market is too small, there will be a large degree of
4This relation is known as the Price-Earnings ratio, or the P/E-ratio.
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uncertainty related to these numbers. In Norway, homeownership was at 77 per cent in
2011,5 meaning that the rental market makes up a relatively small fraction of the housing
market. Second, there can also be a signiﬁcant amount of heterogeneity between home
owners and tenants. In 2013, 75 percent of tenants in Norway were below 45 years.6
Furthermore, students and work immigrants, who typically constitute low-income house-
holds, are greatly overrepresented among tenants. The type of housing that they demand
is not representative of that of the population as a whole. This enhances the diﬃculty
of performing an accurate out-of-sample prediction. In countries where homeownership
rates are lower, the rental equivalence approach is more likely to yield results that are
closer to the true cost development. For instance, in Switzerland, homeownership was at
38.4 per cent in 2004.(Andrews & Sanchez 2011) The Swiss CPI, the target index of the
Swiss National Bank, is made using the rental equivalence approach. The issue is thus
likely less detrimental for the Swiss estimate, even though there is heterogeneity between
tenants and home owners, as the homeownership rate is relatively low. Finally, there is
a possible endogeneity issue for cases where rental contracts have clauses in which rental
prices can be adjusted with respect to the CPI, while the CPI at the same time is deter-
mined by rental prices (Beatty, Larsen & Sommervoll 2009).
Third, the user cost approach is intended to reﬂect the alternative cost of owner-
occupied housing, i.e. the amount of other goods needed in compensation in order to
forego housing consumption in a given period and remain at the same level of utility. Tech-
nically, this is done by calculating an annuity accounting for interest rates and currency
depreciation given a change in the market value of the house. Expressed mathematically,
a general formula for the annuity is:
AH = PH
[
r
1− (1 + r)−N
]
(1)
Where AH denotes the annuity of the value of the housing, PH the present value of hous-
ing, r the real interest rate and N the life time of the durable good (derived from some
assumed depreciation rate). The value of the annuity is increasing in r, as a rise in the real
interest rate increases the ﬁnancial opportunity cost. While incorporating house prices in
a meaningful way, this method suﬀers from a high degree of sensitivity to changes in the
interest rate, yielding very volatile values, which does not match consumers' relatively slow
responses in the housing market. Furthermore, in periods of large house price increases,
capital gains will be large and the estimated user cost may turn out to be negative. The
5Population and housing census, households, 2011 (SSB)
6See Rental market survey, 2013 (SSB).
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theoretical implication of this is inﬁnite demand of housing, which is problematic to inter-
pret economically (Beatty et al. 2009). As housing is a ﬁnite good, a negative price with
ensuing inﬁnite demand is not a possible equilibrium. With a negative price, buyers would
"outbid" each other, lowering the price (at least) to 0. The existence of a negative price in
such a market is thus diﬃcult from a theoretical viewpoint. Moreover, this method suﬀers
when samples are small, as certain types of dwellings easily may be overrepresented in the
sales statistics in a given period. Yet another complication is the possibility of tax bene-
ﬁts from interest deduction, which makes it harder to establish the actual cost of interest
payments. Additionally, the ratio of variable versus ﬁxed interest payments can vary over
time and will be of signiﬁcance when estimating the real interest rate. Furthermore, the
ratio will vary greatly among countries at a given time. Currently, the amount of loans
subject to a variable rate in Norway lies around 90 percent, whereas similar ﬁgures for
Sweden and Denmark lie around 50 percent and slightly below 50 percent, respectively.7
Fourth, as the CPI is intended to be a cost of living index, it is crucial to separate the
consumption and saving properties of a housing purchase when including house prices,
a property the previously discussed approaches does not have. A method seeking to ad-
dress this shortcoming, labeled the consumption cost approach, was introduced by Beatty,
Larsen & Sommervoll (2005). They leave out payments on the principal, which they argue
should be classiﬁed as saving, as well as excluding capital gains (or losses) due to changes
in house prices since the time of purchase, including only interest payments, maintenance
costs, and transaction costs, also taking into account tax deductibility beneﬁts and the
ratios of variable and ﬁxed-rate mortgages. One particular way of performing the estimate
is expressed in Beatty et al. (2009):
Ct = At
[
1
3
t∑
i=t−2
tci + γ
1
3
t∑
i=t−2
mi + Φt (1−τ) γ
{
(iL,t)−1
5
t∑
i=t−4
(iL,t−iS,t)
}
+Ψt (1−τ) γ iL,t
]
(2)
Here, Ct gives the consumption cost of owner-occupied housing in period t. At is the
average house price in period t. tci and mi are transaction costs and maintenance costs
for period i, respectively. τ denotes the tax deductibility rate and γ the holding period.
iL,t is the long-term interest rate in period t, while iS,t is the short-term interest rate in the
corresponding period. Φt gives the share of variable-rate mortgages and Ψt the ﬁxed-rate
mortgage share. Thus, the consumption cost of housing is increasing with transaction
7Data extracted from Statistics Norway, Statistics Sweden and Danmarks Nationalbank
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costs, maintenance costs and mortgage rates. In this speciﬁcation, the variable short-
term rate is computed based on the long-term rate and a moving average of the ﬁxed-rate
premium (i.e. iL,t − iS,t ).
A challenge when employing the consumption cost approach is to decide on particulars
in the estimation, for example how to calculate the expected variable short-term rate, how
many periods to include when estimating transaction costs and so on. Nevertheless, it
provides an alternative to including the consumption of owner-occupied housing in the
CPI with a theoretical economic foundation.
2.3 Central banks and house prices
The last section showed that there are many ways to accommodate the issue of including
house prices in price indices, and they all come with diﬀerent strengths and weaknesses.
The best way to do so is subject to discussion, but it remains true that the choice should
depend on the purpose of the index. In this section I consider the challenges of dealing
with house prices, faced by central banks. Section 2.3.1 reviews the way some central
banks deal with this problem as of now.
The price indices used by most central banks today do not include asset prices. This
choice is not without controversy, and some have stated that a cost-of-living index such
as the CPI is not an ideal measurement of price stability. If the lack of house prices
for instance leads to a downward bias of the price index, inﬂation may seemingly be
below target, while it in reality is above. As a response to inﬂation rates below target,
the central bank is likely to lower the interest rate which will push actual inﬂation even
further from target. Using a particular speciﬁcation of their consumption cost method on
Norwegian data from 2000-2008, Beatty et al. (2009) ﬁnd that inﬂation was 30 percent
over the period, compared to the oﬃcial CPI estimate of 17 percent. The diﬀerence in
estimates is not negligible, and it seems evident that the two inﬂation measures would
require diﬀerent policy responses.
Regardless of what an ideal inﬂation index may be, a brief review of how monetary
policy is conducted will be useful. Inﬂation targeting central banks typically operate
with a loss function which they seek to minimize by controlling the key policy rate. This
loss function will usually include a desired level of inﬂation with preferences of a stable
output level and some aspiration of stability in monetary policy. Deviations from the
desired levels, or target levels, increase the welfare loss of the central bank. A general loss
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function looks something like the following expression:
Lt = (pit − pi∗)2 + λ(yt − y∗)2 + τ(it − i∗)2 (3)
where pit is inﬂation, yt is output levels and it encompasses the stability component in
period t . pi*, y* and i* are their respective target levels. The terms are squared, ensuring
that deviations from every target level contributes negatively to the objective, as sums of
diﬀerent deviations will not counteract each other. λ and τ denote the weights of output
levels and stability relative to inﬂation. A central bank employing a loss function like
this one will care about both price and output stability, while aspiring to avoid ﬁnancial
imbalances. The use of such a loss function highlights the importance of obtaining an
accurate measure of inﬂation. If the central bank conducts monetary policy using an
inappropriate index, it will make suboptimal choices leading to greater losses.
Alchian & Klein (1973) argue that cost-of-living indices such as the CPI are subject
to a systematic bias, as they are based only on the prices of current consumption services.
Their opinion is that a correct measure of inﬂation should consist of a vector of claims to
present and future consumption, rather than simply present consumption, as consumers
optimize their utility over time. When future consumption is included in the utility func-
tion, it seems essential to include asset prices in the price index, as assets provide the link
between current valuation of present consumption relative to future consumption. Mone-
tary policy is conducted using forward looking models, where agents base current choices
on future periods. As assets, such as housing, are considered claims to future units of
consumption, excluding them from the price index implies overlooking the expected cost
of future consumption, which in turn could entail incorrect monetary policy responses.
Alchian & Klein (1973) conclude, however, that to actually construct such an index will
be very diﬃcult (or rather, expensive) because determining the asset vectors that repre-
sent consumers' desired future consumption is diﬃcult, and because "surprisingly little
reliable information exists on current prices of assets".
40 years later, Goodhart (2001) and Bryan, Cecchetti & O'Sullivan (2002) expand on
the analysis of Alchian & Klein (1973). They elaborate on the argument that asset prices,
when used for the purpose of conducting monetary policy, should be included in inﬂation
indicators, and that excluding them introduces a downward bias. They also provide dif-
ferent measures to integrate asset prices into price indices. Bryan et al. (2002) do so by
using a statistical algorithm that adjusts for the volatility of asset prices, reducing the
amount of noise they usually produce. The means to construct an index based on asset
prices do indeed exist, and for central banks the question is now which index one thinks
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is best suited for monetary policy purposes.
Mankiw & Reis (2002) ﬁnd that an inﬂation targeting central bank should base mon-
etary policy on what they call a stability price index where the weights used to construct
the index diﬀer greatly from those of a cost-of-living index. In particular, sectoral char-
acteristics such as the cyclical sensitivity and exposure to idiosyncratic shocks play an
important role in creating the index. They ﬁnd that nominal wages are especially impor-
tant, as they are both cyclically sensitive and not as subject to shocks as other prices,
and should be given extra weight when setting the interest rate.
Complicating the matter even further, developments in house prices not only con-
tribute to inﬂation, but are also sometimes considered as signs of ﬁnancial instabilities.
As such, the question of how to handle house price developments is not only a question of
how they aﬀect price stability, but also whether they can signalize a build-up of ﬁnancial
instabilities, which in turn entails instability of prices and output. That is, there is a
question of whether house prices and other housing variables should be (i) treated on a
day-to-day basis as part of a general business cycle indicator, (ii) be considered in the
context of asset bubbles and potential ﬁnancial crises, or (iii) be considered as both a
business cycle indicator and a more long term indicator of ﬁnancial imbalances. There is
no consensus on the matter as of yet, but there are many opinions.
Before the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-2009, the majority view was that asset price bubbles
are extremely hard to detect and measure, that using the interest rate to aﬀect them
would be too simplistic, and that attempting to do so might give rise to losses in price
and output stability, as a byproduct.8 Some opposed this consensus and argued that asset
prices and housing markets should be given particular consideration. Among them were
Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky & Wadhwani (2000) who claimed that the diﬃculties asso-
ciated with detecting and measuring asset bubbles are not much diﬀerent from dealing
with the theoretical concepts of potential GDP and the equilibrium interest rate. They
concluded that stock prices are too noisy to consider, but that house prices contain useful
information about aggregate price movements.
If an asset bubble is identiﬁed, but still persists, one might consider it a rational bubble.
Galí (2013) argues that if an asset bubble is rational, a leaning against the wind interest
rate policy when facing it may increase its volatility.9 He ﬁnds that, in this setting, opti-
8See e.g. (Bernanke 2002).
9An interest rate policy is said to be leaning against the wind, in the context of asset bubbles, when
a bubble driven by over-optimistic expectations is dampened, and when ﬁnancial markets are stimulated
when activity is particularly low.
12
mal policy dictates a balance between stabilization of aggregate demand and of the bubble
itself, each independently implying diﬀerent monetary policy responses. In the rational
bubble framework, every agent knows that the asset in question has no underlying value,
but one is nevertheless in an equilibrium where it has a positive price, serving as a vessel
transferring wealth between generations. It is possible to argue that a housing bubble
can have this property, and in that setting the insight presented by Galí (2013) will be of
value.
In order to determine how monetary policy should react to the housing market, it is
essential to look at the interaction between monetary policy and the diﬀerent housing
variables. Calza, Monacelli & Stracca (2009) investigate the transmission mechanism be-
tween monetary policy, consumption, house prices and residential investment, and ﬁnd
that the interest rate structure of mortgage contracts is of signiﬁcance. They construct
a DSGE model which they use to show that private consumption is more responsive to
monetary policy when an economy has a larger degree of variable mortgage payments.
This entails diﬀerent optimal responses depending on the country in question. For ex-
ample, in an economy such as Norway, with a high rate of variable rate mortgages, one
would expect a bigger impact from interest rate changes, whereas it is likely smaller in
Sweden and Denmark.
2.3.1 How inﬂation-targeting central banks deal with house prices
When conducting monetary policy, central banks consider a full set of indicators. An
interesting question in that respect is whether they have a stated policy of reacting to
changes in housing variables, be that explicitly or implicitly, through their objective func-
tion. Some may consider the way central banks such as the ECB, the Fed and Norges
Bank handle the issue of house prices unsatisfactory, not, for instance, properly taking
into account the eﬀects of changes in house prices. It is not always clear whether the banks
truly remain passive to such changes. Finocchiaro & Heideken (2013) study whether the
central banks of England, Japan and the U.S. did respond to changes in house prices.
They found that there was evidence for house price movements playing a signiﬁcant role
in the policy reaction functions of all the countries, in spite of them not including house
prices in their target indices, although it is not clear whether this is the result of an ex-
plicit house price targeting or not. With respect to the loss function presented in equation
(3), this could also be a result of reacting to possible ﬁnancial imbalances. Table 1 brieﬂy
reviews the way in which selected central banks currently deal with house prices in their
objective functions for monetary policy.
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Table 1: Selection of central banks and their approach to house prices
Central Bank Target index House prices in index Instability indicator10
European Central Bank Harmonised Index of Con-
sumer Prices
Not included in index No mention in latest
assessment
Bank of England U.K. consumer price index Not included in index Monitored as part of
stability assessment
Federal Reserve Price inﬂation measure
for personal consumption
expenditures,11 consumer
and producer price indices
by the Department of La-
bor
Rental equivalence ap-
proach
Monitored as part of
stability assessment
Norges Bank Norwegian consumer price
index and various deriva-
tions of it12
Rental equivalence ap-
proach
Explicit robustness cri-
terion including house
prices
Sveriges Riksbank Swedish consumer price
index
User cost approach Monitored as part of
stability assessment
Bank of Canada Canadian consumer price
index
User cost approach No mention in latest
assessment
Swiss National Bank Swiss consumer price in-
dex
Rental equivalence ap-
proach
No mention in latest
assessment
Central Bank of Iceland Icelandic consumer price
index
User cost approach Monitored as part of
stability assessment
All central banks in the selection have a consumer price index as their (pri-
mary) target index. Their approach to house prices varies, illustrating the lack of a
10I have examined whether, and how, the respective central banks have an explicit strategy of leaning
against house prices when determining the interest rate, as part of their ﬁnancial stability goals in their
latest assessment, as of May 14. 2015.
11The PCE is produced by the Department of Commerce and covers a wide range of household spending.
12The other indices are 1: KPI-JAE, CPI adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy goods. 2:
KPI-JA, CPI adjusted for tax changes. 3: KPI-JE, CPI excluding energy goods. 4: KPIXE, CPI adjusted
for tax changes and correcting for temporary changes in energy prices(developed by NB).
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consensus on the subject. However, none of them include the prices directly without
some form of adjustment. Notably, ECB and BoE have excluded them altogether, which
makes them subject to the criticism of an excluded goods bias: The inﬂation estimate
will not be accurate as a measure of purchasing power, as a major consumption expense
has been left out of the index. They do include rental prices, but as house price are
excluded completely, a considerable share of average household expenditure is left out.
However, for the past years, Eurostat has been involved in a project to include house
prices in the HICP. In cooperation with many national statistical institutes, including
Statistics Norway, Statistics Sweden and the U.K. Oﬃce for National Statistics, Eurostat
generate an owner-occupied house price index in order to provide data for house prices
at a European level. This index is based on the net-acquisitions approach, and is
generated with a view to improve the relevance and comparability of the HICP.13 If the
owner-occupied house price index were to be included in the HICP, it would suﬀer from
ignoring the investment property of a housing purchase, which in turn might yield an
inaccurate estimate of consumer price inﬂation.
The rental equivalence approach applied in Norway, Switzerland and the U.S. is (to
a varying extent) subject to the criticism of discrepancy between rental and housing
markets, as described in section 2.2.1. The user cost approach used in Canada, Iceland
and Sweden is subject to the criticism that with this method, the potential inconsistency
between short-term nominal interest rates and expected capital gains can yield a statistic
which may be excessively volatile. However, Bergevin (2012) reviews the Canadian
CPI's sensitivity to changes in house prices, and ﬁnds that it is insensitive to such price
changes. This implies a similarly insensitive monetary policy response, contrary to the
common criticism of the user cost approach.14 This suggests that more research on the
user cost approach could be necessary.
An additional important consideration is how to proceed in the case of an implemen-
tation of a new index. If changes are to be made to the presently used price indices, a
precise and credible communication of these changes is vital. A widely recognized insight
in the current literature on inﬂation targeting is that there should be as much clarity
as possible with respect to how the central bank views the current economic situation.
Ideally, every agent in the economy should be aware of the central bank's view of current
13See (Commision Regulation (EU) No 93 2013).
14Bergevin (2012) proposes a supplementary inﬂation indicator based on a net-acquisitions approach.
This approach, however, remains subject to the criticism that it ignores the inter-temporal nature of
house purchases, thus ignoring the role played by interest rates (Beatty et al. 2005).
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inﬂation, output, possible ﬁnancial instabilities and so on, so as to align agents' future
expectations with those of the central bank and achieve an optimal transmission of
monetary policy.
As seen in table 1, central banks deal with housing variables in a variety of ways.
The link between house prices and ﬁnancial bubbles appears to be receiving particular
attention.15 Most central banks now include some review of house prices relating to
ﬁnancial stability in their monetary policy reports. Their approaches vary, however.
Norges Bank stands out as a central bank explicitly including the development of house
prices as part of a robustness criterion, where it is said that "Monetary policy should
also mitigate the risk of a build-up of ﬁnancial imbalances." (Monetary Policy report
1/15). Other central banks, like BoE and the Fed, simply monitor the price developments
of housing, and comment on the degree to which this could be a source of ﬁnancial
instability. Some central banks, like the ECB, do not mention house price developments
in relation to ﬁnancial imbalances. These diﬀerent approaches mirror the fact that there
is, as of now, no consensus on what approach central banks should have to house prices.
In sum, there is still a way to go in order to establish the relationship between
house prices and monetary policy. Central banks and statistical institutes are devoting
more resources to the issue, and it is deﬁnitely a research ﬁeld in development. In a
recent paper, Galí & Gambetti (2014) claim that there seems to be no evidence that
increases in interest rates can shrink the size of asset price bubbles. They state that
"...understanding [the eﬀect of interest rate changes on asset price bubbles] is a necessary
condition before one starts thinking about how monetary policy should respond to asset
prices.", indicating that there still are challenges to overcome before a consensus on the
matter can be reached, and emphasizing the importance of only making well informed
changes to how house prices are considered by an inﬂation-targeting central bank. As
house prices are a nominal value, they are more easily subject to ﬁnancial speculation.
It could be beneﬁcial for central banks to make use of a variable that has a more direct
link to the real economy, as a supplementary indicator. Residential investment is such
a variable, and for the remainder of the thesis, I will evaluate the contributions of
residential investment to GDP growth around recessions, assessing its role in relation to
the business cycle.
15See e.g. The Bank of England Inﬂation Report of February 2015 or The Fed Monetary Policy Report
of February 2015.
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3 Residential Investment as a recession indicator
Residential investment is another interesting variable in relation to monetary policy. The
intertemporal nature of residential investment makes the interaction with monetary pol-
icy complicated, as changes in the interest rate may alter the value of a project after an
investment decision has been made. Furthermore, accounting for a large amount of the
housing sector, the building of new homes is closely intertwined with the development of
housing bubbles and ﬁnancial instabilities. As house prices rise, so does the proﬁtabil-
ity of new house projects. The connection between house price bubbles and recessions
thus makes residential investment especially interesting to study in relation to economic
turmoil. There is a compelling possibility that residential investment could be leading
recessions. In a much cited paper, Leamer (2007) argues that it is residential investment,
rather than house prices, that drives the business cycle. He argues that housing follows
a volume cycle instead of a price cycle, i.e. that it is the volume in sales that is adjusted
in face of economic decline, rather than house prices, because the latter is very sticky
downward. The argument goes as follows: Faced with a sudden decline in demand for
houses, sales volume is lowered, as house prices, being downward sticky, do not adjust
accordingly. A lower sales volume means the existing stock of housing provides a suﬃcient
supply, leading to less construction work and fewer jobs for construction workers and ﬁ-
nance and real estate agents, turning the cycle and possibly initiating a recession. If this
is the case, central banks could hope to better control the business cycle by stabilizing
the cycle of housing starts. Leamer (2007) shows that between 1947 and 2006, 8 out
of 10 U.S. recessions were preceded by signiﬁcant reductions in residential investment.
He claims that this documents the importance of residential investment as a recession
indicator, and uses the result to argue in favor of a monetary policy where housing starts
are given a particular emphasis. Speciﬁcally, he proposes a modiﬁed Taylor rule where,
in addition to a long-term measure of inﬂation, emphasis is given to housing starts and
changes in housing starts, rather than the output gap.
In this empirical section, I investigate the importance of residential investment in the
lead-up to and aftermath of economic recessions. I conduct an analysis along the lines of
Leamer (2007), using the same method on data from several diﬀerent OECD-countries.
First, I outline some stylized facts on residential investment. Second, in section 3.2, I
introduce the data I have collected from the OECD database. Third, in section 3.3, I
present the method used to conduct my analysis. Finally, in section 3.4, I will brieﬂy re-
view the results of Leamer (2007) for the U.S. before presenting the corresponding results
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for the OECD countries in section 3.5.
3.1 Stylized facts
By simply glancing at the national accounts, it may not be immediately apparent why
residential investment is a variable of interest. Its size as share of GDP is not particularly
large and is fairly even across countries, see table 2. In my selection of countries, it
typically lies between ﬁve and eight per cent of GDP, although it is slightly larger in a
few cases. It is also fairly even over time, but has since the 1960s fallen somewhat in
certain countries. Although accounting for a lower share of GDP than other variables
in the national accounts, it is notable for being a particularly volatile variable. As it
is shown in table 2, between 1960 and 2014, residential investment was on average 5.37
per cent of GDP in the U.S. over the sample period, with a standard deviation of 1.29.
By comparison, consumption was at 63.66 per cent, with a standard deviation of 2.67.
In smaller, more open economies, where exports typically account for a larger share of
GDP, residential investment remains a highly volatile variable in relative terms. Over the
same period in the Netherlands, for instance, the average share of residential investment,
consumption and exports to GDP were 7.35, 48.99 and 43.76, with standard deviations
of 1.81, 2.72 and 18.18, respectively. While the export share also stands out as a volatile
variable, in the U.S with a mean of 7.03 and a standard deviation of 3.05, a lot of this can
be attributed to growth. While the mean share of exports between 1960 and 1979 was
26.11 and 4.00 for the Netherlands and the U.S. respectively, it had grown to 68.96 and
10.92, respectively, in the period 2000-2014, with low and quite stable standard deviations
in these short intervals, see tables 6-8 in the appendix. Figure 3 shows the development of
these variables from 1960-2014, and the volatility of residential investment seems apparent.
Particularly for the case of the U.S. the magnitude of the ﬂuctuations is striking. Figure
14 in the appendix shows the evolution of variable shares in all countries for the six
variables presented in section 3.2.
Both the causes and implications of this volatility are compelling problems. Its role
is discussed by Leamer (2007), who argued for and showed that residential investment
exhibits a strong pattern around recessions in the U.S., normally leading both recessions
and the subsequent recoveries. Whether this relation is present in other economies is thus
an interesting case to consider.
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Figure 3: Variables as percentage of GDP, the U.S. and the Netherlands, 1960-2014
The United States
The Netherlands
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Table 2: Variable share of GDP, mean and standard deviation: Total available period
Country Stats Cons. Gov. exp. Res. inv. Other inv. Imports Exports
Australia mean 52,02 17,23 5,53 15,87 -10,00 15,31
sd 1,37 1,23 0,61 3,38 4,79 4,99
Austria mean 55,77 20,78 5,82 19,64 -34,28 33,18
sd 1,91 0,91 1,03 1,39 9,27 11,85
Belgium mean 54,78 25,68 7,18 15,86 -50,32 50,19
sd 2,33 1,60 2,17 2,07 17,13 18,16
Canada mean 52,75 23,18 6,95 12,98 -19,75 23,68
sd 1,79 2,35 0,75 2,08 8,37 8,37
Denmark mean 49,41 25,79 5,68 12,86 -27,08 32,01
sd 2,74 1,64 2,17 2,89 10,92 12,66
Finland mean 51,77 26,06 7,46 18,45 -24,43 23,11
sd 1,49 2,30 1,63 3,32 7,77 10,22
France mean 54,48 23,02 7,09 17,10 -16,54 16,31
sd 0,89 1,47 1,50 1,98 7,15 7,16
Germany mean 57,72 18,66 5,48 15,50 -29,03 32,02
sd 1,62 0,50 0,81 1,35 7,26 9,81
Ireland mean 46,77 19,47 9,32 11,05 -69,66 71,55
sd 2,87 2,02 4,39 3,87 15,14 23,83
Italy mean 58,07 21,22 7,54 13,43 -16,70 16,74
sd 2,17 1,42 2,69 1,99 6,20 6,59
Japan mean 59,53 17,31 5,51 19,83 -9,12 8,74
sd 2,32 2,50 1,88 2,35 2,77 4,19
Korea mean 61,09 18,10 6,12 26,26 -27,97 24,08
sd 9,43 4,89 1,83 5,37 11,90 15,72
Netherlands mean 48,99 23,88 7,35 15,70 -39,63 43,76
sd 2,72 1,75 1,81 1,70 14,94 18,18
New Zealand mean 59,69 17,67 5,39 16,70 -23,96 24,33
sd 2,03 1,14 1,18 3,28 8,14 7,09
Portugal mean 66,14 17,32 6,47 14,41 -25,78 21,40
sd 3,69 2,90 1,55 3,09 9,83 8,09
Sweden mean 49,22 30,87 6,52 16,67 -26,12 26,36
sd 3,35 3,21 3,23 2,38 7,52 11,09
United Kingdom mean 57,80 23,21 9,46 6,84 -20,90 20,58
sd 5,87 2,81 1,98 2,78 7,81 6,25
United States mean 63,66 24,89 5,37 9,54 -8,94 7,03
sd 2,67 4,47 1,29 2,15 4,16 3,05
Total mean 55,54 21,91 6,68 15,48 -26,68 27,24
sd 2,85 2,17 1,81 2,64 8,95 10,40
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3.2 Data
To investigate whether the results of Leamer (2007) generalize to other economies, it is
desirable to look at as many countries as possible. I have extracted data from the OECD
Economic Outlook database (no. 96) of national accounts for 17 diﬀerent countries. The
data collected are real and nominal values for gross domestic product, private consump-
tion, government consumption, residential investment,16 other investments, imports of
goods and services, and exports of goods and services.17 All series are quarterly over the
period Q1 1960 - Q4 2014 (some series are shorter. See full description of the data in
table 5 in the appendix). An alternative would have been to use yearly data, which has
its strength in not being subject to seasonality. However, quarterly data gives a more
detailed picture of the business cycle, which is crucial when investigating developments
in the build up to recessions.
The 17 countries used in the analysis vary in important aspects like size and location,
but are all considered developed countries. They are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The reasoning behind this selection
is mainly data availability: The residential investment statistic is only available for certain
countries at varying starting points in the Economic Outlook database, and the countries
with series starting in 1995 or later have been excluded.18 Norway has been exluded in
spite of the residential investment statistic being available from 1960. The large size of
the Norwegian petroleum sector relative to the rest of the economy hinders an analysis
of partial eﬀects on GDP growth, as the relative size of the diﬀerent components in the
national account ﬂuctuates greatly alongside price ﬂuctuations in the oil and gas markets.
Statistics Norway keeps a separate account which only considers the mainland economy
(that is, the economy excluding the petroleum sector) in order to correct for this problem.
However, the values in the mainland accounts do not add up to the actual GDP growth.
This in turn makes it diﬃcult to conduct an analysis of diﬀerent variables' separate con-
16The nominal values for residential investment were not available in the OECD database and have
been calculated based on the deﬂator for ﬁxed capital formation. For a thorough discussion of the impact
of this approximation, see the appendix.
17It would have been possible to diﬀerentiate the diﬀerent components of GDP in a more detailed
manner, keeping separate accounts of diﬀerent kinds of consumption, government expenditure and so
on. However, as the idea is to take a particularly close look at the role of residential investment around
recessions, this simpliﬁcation serves the purpose of the exercise well.
18They are Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Luxembourg and Slovenia.
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tribution to growth in GDP.19 For the purpose of this analysis, the exclusion of Norway
is an unfortunate but not serious issue, as the remaining amount of data is adequate. In
addition, I have extracted data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the U.S. over the
period 1947 - 2014. The data includes the same six variables as in the OECD data. In
addition, inventories are accounted for separately, rather than counting as part of other
investment. This means that a total of 18 countries are considered in the analysis.
3.3 Method
This section seeks to explain the methodology used in the thesis, which follows the method-
ology employed by Leamer (2007). Leamer makes use of a statistic giving variables' quar-
terly contributions to GDP growth. He estimates trend contributions from each variable,
which he then uses to establish abnormal contributions in a given period. The abnor-
mal contributions are cumulated and given an interpretation around recessions. First,
I explain the method of calculating contributions to percentage change in GDP (CPC).
Second, I explain how the kernel regression smoother is used to decompose a trend from
the CPC-data. Finally, I explain how abnormal contributions to CPC from various GDP
components are calculated and cumulated, and clarify how the expressions should be in-
terpreted.
With the data from the national accounts in hand, the ﬁrst step is to generate the
statistic for contributions to percentage change of GDP. The CPC statistic yields a de-
composition of each variable's contribution to GDP growth between two periods, allowing
for an analysis of the drivers of GDP growth. The construction of the CPC statistic fol-
lows Ehemann, Katz & Moulton (2000), who generate a Fisher price index and evaluate
changes in individual variables with respect to an aggregate (in my case being GDP).20
The reason for using the CPC statistic rather than simply using variables' share of GDP,
is that there can be relative price changes between variables from one period to another,
which will give inaccurate ﬁgures for contributions to real GDP growth, as using a vari-
able's share does not pick up this eﬀect. The CPC statistic accounts for this problem by
considering both price- and quantity eﬀects between periods, and is given by:
CPCti = 100 ∗ (pt−1i + pti/FPI t)(xti − xt−1i )/(pt−1 + pt/FPI t)xt−1 (4)
19An attempt to correct for this problem is an interesting next step for further research.
20The Fisher price index is deﬁned as the geometric mean of the Laspeyre and Paasche price indices,
which are both given in equation 5. These 3 price indices all represent diﬀerent ways of estimating
aggregate price changes between periods.
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Where CPCi
t is the contribution of the ith good to the total percentage change in real
GDP from period t-1 to period t, pi
t and xi
t are price and quantity of good i in period t
respectively, and pt and xt are price and quantity vectors at time t. FPIt is the (bilateral)
Fisher price index, which is given by:
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(5)
Pi
t and Qi
t is the price and quantity of good i in period t, respectively. Using the Fisher
price index in equation (4) has the beneﬁt of ensuring that the CPC-variables add up
exactly to the real GDP growth rate (Ehemann et al. 2000).
When the CPC-numbers have been calculated, the next step is to establish a long-
term trend. The reason for wanting to ﬁnd a long-term trend is that GDP growth seems
to adhere to a strong trend in the long run. The goal of this step is to ﬁnd diﬀerent
variables' "normal" contribution to that long-term trend. Leamer (2007) estimates it
using the kernel regression smoother, which he argues is better suited to picture a long-
term trend, as opposed to, for instance, the Hodrick-Prescott Filter, because the former
has a lower frequency.21 The kernel regression ﬁts a curve to a data set. A kernel function
is deﬁned, and is applied identically at every data point (the target point) in the series.
It gives weight to the target point as well as declining weights to neighboring points, the
size of the weights being based on the distance from the target (Rodriguez 2001). This
yields a new set of data which is smoother, i.e. the estimated trend. The kernel function
used for this exercise is the Gaussian kernel smoother, one of the more common kernel
functions in use:22
K(u) =
1√
2pi
e−
1
2
u2 (6)
where u is given by
u =
x∗ − xi
h
(7)
Here, x* is the location of the target point in the sequence, and xi represents the location of
diﬀerent neighboring data points. h is the kernel bandwith, also known as the smoothing
parameter, which serves as a scale parameter. For this exercise, a bandwith of h=30 is
used, as this is the value which appears to give the closest match to the results of Leamer.
21Higher frequency ﬁlters like the HP-ﬁlter are more likely to pick up business cycle trends.
22Read more about kernel smoothing and the choice of kernel smoother in Cleveland, Cleveland, McRae
& Terpenning (1990), Singh, Mandal & Basu (2005), Rodriguez (2001)
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The entire weight given to each data point xi when evaluating target point x
* is then:
Wi(x
∗) =
K(x
∗−xi
h
)∑n
i=1K(
x∗−xi
h
)
(8)
Note that the weights at any target point x* sum up to 1, i.e.
∑n
i=1Wi(x
∗) = 1. The
kernel smoother for target point x* is thus:
f(x∗) =
n∑
i=1
Wi(x
∗)yi (9)
where yi gives the ith CPC-value. Applying this technique to every variable's set of
CPC-values gives the trend estimates for each variable. If in any period a variable has
a contribution to growth equal to the estimated trend, this is thus considered a normal
contribution.
When a normal contribution to GDP growth is established with the kernel regres-
sion, an abnormal contribution in a given period is calculated by subtracting the trend-
component from the CPC-estimate for that period. For every period, the abnormal con-
tributions are then cumulated into levels that express the sum of abnormal contributions
leading up to that point:
CACti =
t∑
s=1
Asi (10)
where Ai
t gives the abnormal contribution of variable i in period t and s=1 is the initial
period of the series. These values are then plotted into curves that (by deﬁnition) oscillate
around 0; one curve for each GDP component. As a result, a variable's contribution to
GDP growth is greater than normal whenever the curve moves up and less than normal
when the curve moves down. As an example, ﬁgure 4 shows the graph for the cumulative
abnormal contribution of residential investment in the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and
the U.K. The series all include both sustained inclines and declines in the statistic, signify-
ing periods of consecutive abnormally high and low contributions to growth, respectively.
Similar graphs for all variables and countries are found in the appendix, found in the top
row of ﬁgures 15 - 32, which also have recessions highlighted.
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Figure 4: Cumulative abnormal contribution of residential investment
Netherlands Portugal
Sweden United Kingdom
The ﬁnal step is to study the abnormal contributions around recessions. In order to
obtain instructive results, a critical issue is how recessions are deﬁned. As a rule, I have
deﬁned two consecutive quarters of real GDP decline as a recession. The quarter following
the ﬁrst real GDP decline marks the recession start, meaning that the cycle peak is the
quarter in which GDP starts to fall. An economy is declared "healthy" when at least eight
quarters have passed, with six of the preceding eight quarters having positive real GDP
growth. When an economy is declared healthy, two new consecutive quarters of decline
in real GDP initiates a new recession. 23 There are other ways to deﬁne recessions as
23The scheme for deciding the end of a recession may seem like an unnecessarily convoluted rule, but is
what I deemed appropriate based on the evaluated data. It was necessary with a time restriction as two
consecutive quarters of decline often are immediately followed by more decline, giving rise to an excessive
amount of recessions. Furthermore, certain series ﬂuctuate a great deal, rarely seeing six consecutive
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well, where other variables are taken into consideration. Conducting diﬀerent evaluations,
such as assessing unemployment levels, or even subjectively ruling that very mild GDP
declines might not be enough to initiate a recession, would likely lead to a diﬀerent dating
of recessions. Nevertheless, when working with 50 years of data for 17 countries it was
necessary to use a consistent rule, rather than dating recessions in a less rigid manner,
both for transparency and not least for reasons of simplicity. Table 3 gives an overview
of all recession starts in the series.
Table 3: List of recession starts estimated by real GDP growth
Country Recession starts
Australia 1961Q2, 1965Q4, 1971Q3, 1975Q3, 1977Q3, 1981Q4, 1991Q1
Austria 1974Q4, 1977Q4, 1980Q3, 1984Q1, 2001Q1, 2008Q2, 2012Q4
Belgium 1976Q4, 1980Q3, 1992Q2, 2001Q2, 2008Q3
Canada 1980Q2, 1990Q1, 2008Q4
Denmark 1973Q4, 1979Q3, 1987Q2, 1992Q4, 2006Q3
Finland 1975Q2, 1980Q4, 1990Q2, 2008Q1, 2012Q2
France 1974Q4, 1990Q4, 2008Q2
Germany 1995Q4, 2002Q4, 2008Q1, 2012Q4
Ireland 2008Q1
Italy 1970Q4, 1974Q4, 1977Q2, 1980Q2, 1992Q2, 2001Q2, 2007Q3, 2011Q3
Japan 1993Q2, 2001Q2, 2008Q2
Korea 1979Q3, 1997Q4, 2003Q1
Netherlands 1962Q4, 1973Q2, 1980Q2, 2008Q2, 2011Q2
New Zealand 1967Q1, 1970Q2, 1974Q4, 1982Q4, 1986Q4, 1991Q1, 2008Q1
Portugal 1974Q4, 1982Q4, 1992Q2, 2002Q2, 2008Q2, 2010Q3
Sweden 1976Q3, 1990Q3, 2008Q1, 2012Q3
United Kingdom 1969Q4, 1973Q3, 1979Q4, 1990Q3, 2008Q2
United States24 1948Q4, 1953Q2, 1957Q3, 1960Q2, 1969Q4, 1973Q4, 1980Q1, 1981Q3,
1990Q3, 2001Q1, 2007Q4
Finally, I evaluate all variables' contribution to real GDP growth around recessions.
The period before a recession is deﬁned as a cycle peak, and I construct ﬁgures that show
the contributions of a variable before and after this peak. Following Leamer (2007), I
consider both the four quarters preceding a cycle peak and the eight quarters following
the peak in separate ﬁgures. To illustrate this, a copy of ﬁgure 6 in Leamer (2007) is
given in ﬁgure 5. The cumulative abnormal contribution of the variable in question in
the cycle peak quarter is subtracted from the considered quarters in every graph, so
quarters of growth. Although being in good shape, these economies would often not be eligible for new
recessions without this "six out of eight" rule.
24U.S. recession dates are taken from the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee.
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Figure 5: From Leamer, 2007
that they display the behavior of the variable contribution to real GDP growth around
recessions. Hence if a line declines towards zero before a recession, it means that the
contribution is abnormally low, i.e. the variable contributes to weaker GDP growth. If
a line rises, the contribution is abnormally high, contributing to stronger GDP growth.
It is also worthwhile to keep in mind that a ﬂat line signiﬁes a normal contribution to
GDP growth. In section 3.4, I replicate the results of Leamer (2007). The replication
is included in the thesis both to ensure that I employ the correct methodology, and to
examine whether the results hold also for the most recent recession (as Leamer's result
only cover the years up to 2007). In section 3.5, I examine whether the results generalize
to other countries.
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3.4 Replication of Leamer - with an update!
Leamer (2007) uses ﬁgure 5 to argue that residential investment typically contributes
abnormally low before a recession, and abnormally high about one year into the recession,
suggesting that residential investment leads the recession cycle. To replicate Leamer, the
method described in the previous section is applied on US data extracted from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics for the period from 1947 to 2014. As the latest data used in the paper
is from 2006, this means that an additional eight years of data are included as supplements
to the original analysis.25 The mean contributions to percentage change in GDP for the
total period from all variables are given in table 4, section 3.5, and are very similar to
those of Leamer (2007). This is as expected, having supplemented the analysis with just
eight more years of data. Over the sample period, U.S. real GDP growth has averaged 3.18
per cent. Private consumption is the main contributor to growth, followed by government
expenditure and other investment, which both are at similar levels. Imports and exports
are at similar levels as well. Residential investment is relatively unimportant for long
run growth, contributing to only three per cent of long run growth, but is important
around recessions. Figures 6 and 7 present the results from the replication for abnormal
contributions from residential investment. Figure 6 compares the abnormal contributions
in the replica with the abnormal contributions in Leamer (2007), while ﬁgures 7a and 7b
show the abnormal contributions before and after a recession, respectively.
From ﬁgure 6, I conclude that the replica is suﬃciently accurate: The abnormal contri-
bution of residential investment is very similar. This pattern extends to all the other
ﬁgures that are present in both Leamer's paper and this replication, see ﬁgure 32 in the
appendix.26
The new data from the years after Leamer (2007) are well worth to look at. The
Great Recession started in Q4 2007 in the U.S. In line with Leamer (2007), there was
a large drop in the contribution to real GDP growth from residential investment in the
25The data used by Leamer is decomposed into more categories compared to the BLS data I have
extracted. For example, in the dataset I use, consumption is represented by one single variable, whereas
the dataset used by Leamer has consumption divided into three categories; durables, non-durables and
services. The same goes for government expenditure, which is also divided into three subcategories.
Hence, this replica gives a less detailed and not fully comparable outcome, but the main results are the
same.
26There are some very small numerical diﬀerences between the CPC values, but it is negligible. This
diﬀerence may arise from a few oddities found early in the volume data. There are a few very large
residual terms, accompanied with some zero-terms, which pose a challenge for the estimation. How this
is dealt with has a slight impact on the outcome.
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Figure 6: Cumulative abnormal contribution from residential investment, recessions highlighted
(a) Replica with update (b) Figure from Leamer (2007)
Figure 7: Cumulative abnormal contribution from residential investment, before and during
recessions
(a) Contribution before recession (b) Contribution during recession
four preceding quarters. However, eight quarters after, residential investment had not yet
picked up. According to Leamer (2007), residential investment is among the ﬁrst variables
to contribute to growth following a recession, however, this picture is not as clear for the
Great Recession. The recovery did not commence until a long time had passed; after eight
quarters the negative contribution to growth had only just stopped. Apart from govern-
ment expenditure, which contributed positively to growth throughout the recession, due
to massive ﬁscal stimulus, no variables stand out as positive contributors eight quarters
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after. The non-existing V-shape, represented in the other recessions studied, could be a
result of the recent recession being particularly severe, and also housing related.
3.5 Results for OECD countries
This section presents the results of the analysis for the 17 OECD countries introduced
in section 3.2. First, I look at the contributions to percentage change in GDP from all
variables. Then, I look at the abnormal contributions, focusing on recessions, providing
an analysis of the ﬁndings.
Table 4 gives the decomposition of contributions to growth for all countries between
1960 and 2014, as well as giving the total country average for the same interval.27 Total
mean GDP growth is 3 per cent, where consumption contributed to 1.59 percentage points
of this, government expenditure for 0.48 and so on. An interesting fact which generalizes
well is that residential investment is of low importance for GDP growth, while maintaining
a very high standard deviation. For an overview of speciﬁc periods, see tables 9-11 in the
appendix.
27Note that the quarterly contributions have been converted to yearly rates by multiplying every quarter
by 4.
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Table 4: Contributions to percentage change in GDP, all available periods28
Country Stats GDP Cons. Gov. Res. inv. Other inv. Imp. Exp.
Australia mean 3,48 1,97 0,59 0,30 0,76 -1,00 0,84
sd 4,28 1,76 1,22 1,52 4,34 2,72 2,70
Austria mean 2,35 1,27 0,37 0,10 0,41 -1,53 1,73
sd 2,82 1,45 0,62 0,40 3,08 2,98 3,27
Belgium mean 2,63 1,24 0,49 0,14 0,53 -2,52 2,70
sd 2,84 1,26 0,51 1,61 1,99 4,59 4,66
Canada mean 3,23 1,87 0,55 0,29 0,52 -1,46 1,34
sd 3,59 1,86 0,94 1,42 3,40 2,99 3,06
Denmark mean 2,04 0,97 0,54 0,08 0,41 -1,58 1,60
sd 3,70 2,44 0,74 1,94 3,61 3,38 3,10
Finland mean 2,84 1,58 0,47 0,18 0,51 -1,24 1,49
sd 5,56 2,85 0,65 1,11 11,26 5,46 6,69
France mean 2,86 1,57 0,60 0,19 0,44 -1,06 1,07
sd 3,75 1,76 0,37 0,71 2,83 1,92 1,87
Germany mean 1,22 0,61 0,30 0,06 -0,02 -1,32 1,59
sd 3,38 1,89 0,67 0,68 2,77 2,84 3,66
Ireland mean 4,27 1,70 0,46 0,07 0,81 -5,04 7,66
sd 7,62 2,91 0,98 1,93 7,41 10,11 10,43
Italy mean 2,43 1,56 0,34 0,10 0,37 -0,80 0,94
sd 4,03 2,07 0,55 0,70 4,03 2,76 2,62
Japan mean 3,88 1,96 0,47 0,28 1,12 -0,56 0,82
sd 5,38 2,85 0,53 1,42 3,50 1,58 2,02
Korea mean 6,86 3,17 0,59 0,45 2,06 -2,94 3,62
sd 6,71 4,37 0,57 3,61 9,88 7,07 4,78
Netherlands mean 2,77 1,36 0,55 0,15 0,46 -2,61 2,87
sd 5,70 2,47 1,11 2,51 5,21 4,30 5,04
New Zealand mean 2,72 1,58 0,42 0,09 0,66 -1,19 1,13
sd 12,73 4,04 1,68 1,86 12,66 5,90 5,47
Portugal mean 2,49 1,56 0,51 0,11 0,48 -1,46 1,28
sd 3,87 2,92 0,64 0,91 4,44 3,84 2,54
Sweden mean 2,40 0,98 0,49 0,04 0,55 -1,24 1,58
sd 3,06 1,33 0,52 1,15 3,15 2,76 3,15
United Kingdom mean 2,31 1,67 0,33 0,17 0,40 -1,08 1,05
sd 3,86 2,71 0,85 2,64 5,77 3,25 3,48
United States29 mean 3,18 2,07 0,55 0,11 0,49 -0,47 0,37
sd 3,87 2,06 1,39 0,94 1,13 1,13 1,06
Total mean 3,00 1,59 0,48 0,16 0,61 -1,62 1,87
sd 4,82 2,39 0,81 1,50 5,02 3,87 3,87
28Note that the components' contributions to real GDP growth do not always add exactly up to GDP.
Rounding is the reason for most of this discrepancy. Furthermore, some of it originates from the use
of an inaccurate deﬂator for residential investment. In addition, some series are subject to considerable
residual terms which have been left out of the table.
29The variable "inventories", which is exclusive to the U.S. series, has been left out of the table. Its
mean contribution to real GDP growth is very close to zero in all time intervals, although standing out
as highly volatile. Note also that other investment is a much less volatile variable in the U.S. than in
other countries, as a result of this.
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Being mean values, the CPC values should be interpreted as the normal contributions
from each variable to real GDP growth for their respective intervals. There are a lot
of similarities between these values and the corresponding U.S. values presented in
the previous section, but also some noteworthy diﬀerences. Consumption stands out
as the most important contributor to long run GDP trend growth, and is also one of
the more stable contributors. This holds well across all countries and time intervals.
Similarly stable, but less important as a driver of growth, is government expenditures.
Furthermore, the contribution to growth from exports and imports is in general much
higher than in the U.S. This is an expected result and coincides well with the higher share
of imports and exports to GDP, as discussed in section 3.1, see table 2. However, their
net contribution to growth is of limited size. Naturally, as dictated by the trade balance,
increasing exports allows for increased imports, and increasing imports requires increased
exports, and their movements will track each other closely in the long run. As exports
are a positive contributor to GDP growth and imports a negative contributor, their
net contribution is thus typically somewhere close to zero. Other investment, i.e. total
private investment minus residential investment, stands out as another variable fairly
important for long run GDP growth, and it appears to be the most volatile variable,
along with residential investment. This is somewhat diﬀerent from the data for the U.S.,
where investments are not as volatile, but there is a reasonable explanation: Inventories,
the most volatile variable in the U.S. series, is not accounted for separately in the
OECD data I have used, but is rather included as part of other investments. It therefore
seems reasonable to assume that a lot of the observed volatility in other investments'
contribution to growth stems from this simpliﬁcation. In addition, some countries, like
Finland, Korea and New Zealand, have an exceptionally high standard deviation for other
investment, raising the mean standard deviation by more than one. Most importantly,
like in the U.S., residential investment is not a major contributor to GDP growth under
normal circumstances. In fact, since 2000, it has on average contributed to a fall in GDP
across countries, see table 11 in the appendix. The fact that it tips over on the negative
side can largely be attributed to housing market crashes in Portugal and Ireland, but the
weak contribution of residential investment in the remaining countries is nevertheless an
interesting feature, and that residential investment stands out as a particularly volatile
variable remains true in all intervals. The question is then whether this excess volatility
translates into evidence for importance around recessions. That is, speciﬁcally, whether
it is a leading variable for recessions, and important in recoveries, as Leamer (2007)
observed it for the U.S.
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Turning to the abnormal contributions to real GDP growth, especially around
recessions, the upper row in ﬁgures 15 - 32 in the appendix show the cumulative abnormal
contributions to real GDP growth of all variables and countries considered. The next three
rows in the same ﬁgures show the abnormal contributions before and after recessions for
the same variables.
Leamer (2007) shows that residential investment is a good indicator of recessions for
the U.S., as it usually contributed negatively to GDP growth ahead of recessions. While
there to some extent seems to be evidence of such a trend being present in other countries,
it does not seem to generalize to the entire selection. In some cases, in particular for
that of Canada, the U.S. pattern carries on remarkably well, especially before recessions,
and to some extent during the recessions. It might seem as if the pattern for recovery is
broken following the ﬁrst recession in the series, but if we examine the entire timeline
for abnormal contributions of residential investment (see ﬁgure 18), we see that the
increase in contribution following the recession is temporary, followed by an even larger
drop, before it quickly picks up and contributes to a recovery, and should therefore be
considered in line with the pattern. The particularly interesting feature for Canada is
the immensity of the drop ahead of the recession: while on average contributing to 0.29
percentage points of GDP growth per year, residential investment contributes to a fall
in GDP of at least 0.4 percentage points in the last quarter preceding all Canadian
recessions.
There are other cases where the predictive power of residential investment also
appears to be good. Austria has a number of recessions where residential investment
contributes to weaker GDP before recessions, and is abnormally stronger in the recovery.
In France, too, there are strong signs of a pattern where a fall in residential investment
leads recessions. Other countries where there are tendencies towards such a pattern
include Finland, Germany, Ireland, Portugal and the United Kingdom (although one
should be especially careful with generalizations for Ireland, having only a single, very
deep recession in the entire time interval). Conversely, there are several countries in
the series where it is hard to argue in favor of an existence of such a pattern. In Italy,
for instance, there does not seem to be a consistent behavior for residential investment
around recessions. Out of the eight recessions in the series, there are arguably only two
cases where it behaves like the recession predicting variable it is for the U.S., namely the
ﬁrst and the last one. Other than that, contributions are mostly normal before recessions,
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and neither stand out as contributing to the recovery. 30 Italy is not a sole exception in
this respect. Although most countries seem to have had at least one recession preceded
by a substantial drop in residential investment, this does not appear to be a feature
generalizable across time and between countries. For example, in countries including,
but not limited to, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands and Sweden, residential investment
does not immediately stand out as a variable of particular importance in relation to
recessions. Considering the amount of countries where this feature is absent, it seems
that we cannot easily generalize the results from the U.S. to other countries.
Private consumption appears to behave a lot like in the U.S. data. As mentioned, it
is the most important contributor to trend growth, but it does experience ﬂuctuations.
During recessions, it can often contribute to rather large drops in GDP growth, but
it normally picks up and contributes to stronger GDP within the 2 years following a
recession start. For the U.S., Leamer (2007) shows that consumption durables, a lot like
residential investment, was leading recessions. If a pattern like this exists, however, it is
hard to establish as long as all consumption is collected in a single category. In general,
it does not stand out in such a way.
Government expenditure is relatively stable measured in standard deviation, and this
is largely the case around recessions as well. I have not been able to ﬁnd a relation
between government expenditure and recession starts, although it seemingly often
contributes to growth following a recession, which is likely to reﬂect a counter-cyclical
ﬁscal policy. This is particularly visible for France, where government expenditure is
close to normal levels before a recession, but contributes abnormally to growth following
all recessions in the series (ﬁgure 21).
Other investment stands out as a variable with very large ﬂuctuations relative to
its normal contribution to GDP growth. Generally, it does not appear to be leading
recessions, but it is often a substantial drag on GDP following a recession (see e.g.
Portugal, ﬁgure 29).
Imports and exports have, as expected, a much larger impact on growth during
economic downturns. Speciﬁcally, it seems as if higher contributions to growth from
imports (i.e. smaller negative contributions) helps economies recover more quickly (see
e.g. Belgium, Finland and Portugal in ﬁgures 17, 20 and 29, respectively)
For the countries where residential investment seems to have some predictive
30In the data, Italy stands out as a particularly erratic economy, falling into more recessions than other
countries and seeing relatively volatile contributions to growth from all variables.
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power for recessions as in the U.S., several interesting features emerge. First, one of the
most compelling traits found in the U.S. data was that, typically, the contribution to
growth from residential investment in the recovery from recessions more than counteracted
the negative contribution prior to and during the recession. This does not seem to be the
case for the other countries. In almost every case, like for Finland, France and the U.K.,
contributions to growth turn positive only after several quarters, and these contributions
are not nearly enough to make up for the preceding fall. Perhaps this is an indication
of the U.S. economy being more dynamic and transitioning faster following economic
downturns; that a typical U.S. recession simply is shorter than those of other countries.
3.5.1 False positives and false negatives
Leamer (2007) discusses the presence of false positives and false negatives in the data.
A false positive from a variable is said to occur if the cumulative abnormal contributions
drop sharply without initiating a recession, represented by a deep trough in the time-
line for cumulative abnormal contributions. A false negative is simply when a recession
starts without any indication from the variable on beforehand, an undesirable occurence
for a prospective leading variable. Leamer (2007) ﬁnds only two false positives and two
negatives in a 60-year span for residential investment in the U.S. I ﬁnd that for Austria,
Canada and France, residential investment does quite well with respect to false negatives.
Looking at the timelines for these countries gives more information about the possibil-
ity of false positives. Figure 8 shows the cumulative abnormal contributions to growth
from residential investment for Austria, Canada and France, and highlights the possible
presence of false positives and negatives. For Austria, there are a few false negatives in
Figure 8: False positives and negatives from residential investment
Austria Canada France
the series, but a majority of the recessions remain "predicted" by abnormally low contri-
butions to growth from residential investment. There appears to be only one single false
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positive around 1990, meaning that an abnormal drop in residential investment correctly
has predicted an Austrian recession four out of ﬁve times. Canada has a sharp decline in
contributions to growth from residential investment ahead of all three recessions, and is as
such void of false negatives. There are, however, a few candidates for false positives early
in the series, as well as one following the 1990 recession.31 Like for Canada, residential
investment serves as a good recession indicator for France, correctly predicting all three
recessions in the series. The timeline only gives an indication of a single potential false
positive following the 1974 recession.
Repeating the same exercise for private consumption, which, for the U.S., for con-
sumption durables in particular, was shown to have a similar pattern to that of residential
investment, is instructive. Figure 9 shows that for the three countries discussed above, the
diﬀerence in "predictive power" between the variables is seemingly not that great, as the
movements in their abnormal contributions are similar. Generally, there appears to be a
higher number of false positives from private consumption and, at a ﬁrst glance, no more
false negatives. However, upon closer inspection it seems that residential investment often
Figure 9: False positives and negatives from private consumption
Austria Canada France
is slightly ahead of consumption in contributing negatively to GDP growth. Both in the
Canadian and French 1990 recessions, drops in contributions from residential investment
precedes drops from consumption by a quarter or two. It should also be noted that the
magnitude of the reduced contributions to growth relative to the normal contribution is
greater for residential investment than for consumption. For instance, in Canada, their
mean contribution to growth is respectively 0.29 and 1.87, separated by a factor of six.
In the year before the 1980 recession, they both contributed to a fall of around 1.3 per-
31It should be kept in mind, however, that using the ﬁxed capital formation deﬂator likely overestimates
the contributions, particularly early in the series. This gives rise to larger ﬂuctuations, and the degree to
which these are false positives is unclear.
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cent of GDP from trend levels, making the impact relative to normal levels six times as
large for residential investment, a rather large diﬀerence. This is a representative case,
as the relative impact of residential investment ahead of "predicted recessions" typically
is larger than that of consumption. These are some of the reasons why residential invest-
ment stands out as a particularly interesting variable to consider in relation to recessions,
also outside of the U.S.
3.5.2 Explanations for a weaker link between residential investment and re-
cessions
Like in the U.S., residential investment appears to serve as a recession predictor in
many cases, but there is also a large number of cases where it does not. There are several
possible explanations for why the U.S. pattern is not found in much of the OECD data.
An alluringly simple one is that the result is a mere coincidence, and that we should
not expect to ﬁnd a similar pattern elsewhere. However, this explanation is likely too
simplistic, if not outright false. For one thing, Leamer (2007) thoroughly documents the
importance of residential investment in relation to recessions in the U.S., and the fact that
it seemingly does not generalize to all other countries does not dismantle that evidence.
Furthermore, there appears to be some evidence in the data for such a trend to exist in
certain countries, and it seems too convenient to blame it all on coincidence. Another
possible explanation is that the way in which recessions are dated could be overly simpli-
ﬁed. This could entail that the pattern is there, and would have been found if recession
starts had been determined in a more reﬁned manner.32 Regardless, determining a re-
cession start by 2 consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth is a common method,
and changing the dating scheme will likely not alter the recession starts too much. In
addition, there is no guarantee that minor changes of recession dates would grant other
results. It seems probable that the answer lies elsewhere.
A more plausible explanation is that not all recessions are the same, and that they can
be caused for a variety of reasons. It could be the case that while residential investment
is more likely to initiate domestic recessions, some recessions are of global character and
are not likely to be preceded by signiﬁcant reductions from residential investment in a
given country. For instance, many of the considered countries entered recessions around
2001, following the bursting of the U.S. dotcom bubble. None of these were preceded by
signiﬁcant reduced contributions to growth from residential investment, as they emerged
32For instance, the NBER deﬁnes U.S. recessions based on a number of indicators, such as real GDP,
real income and employment(National Bureau of Economic Research 2015).
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as a result of global economic turmoil. Similarly, several European countries entered
recessions following the 2011 euro crisis. Many of these, including those in Italy, Nether-
lands and Portugal, were preceded by reduced contributions to growth from government
expenditure rather than residential investment, possibly indicating that reduced govern-
ment spending was the cause of the downturns. It seems likely that many other recessions
could be explained with a narrative not including residential investment. Without having
full knowledge of the economic history for each country, it is diﬃcult to weave a history
around the recessions, but it could be the case that the 17 OECD countries diﬀer signiﬁ-
cantly from the U.S. in how their recessions come about.
Furthermore, Leamer (2007) suggests that smaller open countries who are more de-
pendent on trade, could be "importing" the business cycle via reduced exports or through
turbulence in the exchange rate, while larger countries like the U.S. are less aﬀected by
this kind of turmoil and can "sustain their own cycle". If a recession is imported, one
transmission mechanism could be that as demand for exported goods drops, a country
sees a drop in the contribution to growth from exports. If the eﬀect is strong enough,
this initiates a recession, both from the direct eﬀect on GDP growth of reduced income
from exports, as well as secondary multiplier eﬀects. The magnitude and duration of the
negative contributions following the recession start will depend on, among other things,
the severity of the imported recession. One way to approach this idea is to group the
countries in the selection by size, and check for evidence that the smaller countries im-
port recessions while larger countries' cycles develop independently.
To investigate the importance of openness and country size, I rank countries by popu-
lation size. I then look at whether there is a diﬀerence in how residential investment and
exports contribute to GDP around recessions, depending on the country size.33 Including
the U.S., there are 18 countries which can be divided into three groups of six, ranked
by population. The six largest countries are the U.S., Japan, Germany, France, United
Kingdom and Italy. The middle six are Korea, Canada, Australia, Netherlands, Belgium
and Portugal. The smallest six are Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and New
Zealand.34
In the largest group, both the United States, Germany, France and the United King-
dom have to varying extents seen residential investment work as a recession predictor.
33A diﬀerent way to rank countries could have been based on exports as share of GDP, but this would
not substantially change the groups.
34The ranking is based on United Nations population data from 2012. Coincidentally, the smallest
group has countries with population sizes below 10 million, the middle group between 10 and 50 million,
while the largest group has populations above 50 million.
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While it is harder to argue that case for Japan, and certainly diﬃcult for Italy, it seems
that the ﬁndings of Leamer (2007) holds fairly well for the largest group. The role of ex-
ports seems to be diﬀerent, as there are only certain instances where it appears to stand
out, such as the 2001 recession in Japan and the 1980 recession in Italy, who appear to be
preceded by large negative contributions to growth from exports. Exports do not seem
to lead recessions for either of these countries in a systematic manner.
In the middle group, only Canada and Portugal have a clear trend of residential in-
vestment leading recessions. In Korea, Netherlands and Belgium, there does not seem to
be such a trend present, whereas the picture is somewhat unclear for Australia. The role
of exports is markedly diﬀerent, and for the case of Belgium it might appear as if it, to
some extent, leads recessions, as seen in ﬁgure 10. Furthermore, it typically contributes
more than other variables in the recovery. That this occurs for Belgium is particularly
interesting, as it is the country in the series with the highest exports as share of GDP.
However, in this manner Belgium is alone, as such a consistent role cannot be attributed
to exports for the other countries in this group. There are a few singular incidents where
it does appear to stand out, like before the 1974 recession in Portugal and the 2008 re-
cession in Canada.
Figure 10: Abnormal contributions from exports around recessions, Belgium
Contribution before recession Contribution during recession
In the smallest group, residential investment appears to lead recessions both in Aus-
tria, Finland and Ireland, while it does not in Sweden, Denmark nor New Zealand. Again,
there appears to be a number of singular instances where recessions are preceded by a
signiﬁcant reduction in exports (e.g. Denmark 1992, Finland 1975, Ireland 2008), but
exports do not seem to be leading recessions in general. This is perhaps a surprising
result, as this group of relatively small countries seems likely to be the most susceptible
to such an eﬀect, should it exist.
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All in all, exports seem to provide an explanation for occasional economic downturns,
as illustrated by ﬁgure 11, but there does not appear to be a systematic connection be-
tween the initiation of recessions and reduced growth contributions from exports. To sum
Figure 11: Abnormal contributions by exports before recessions
Japan Canada Denmark
up, residential investment seems to take a less prominent role as a predictor for recessions
in the 17 OECD countries considered than in the U.S. Some recessions are caused by
booms followed by drops in residential investment, some by sharp reductions in govern-
ment spending, others through reduced income from exports, etc. For instance, consider
the case of Finland, with ﬁve recessions during the time period considered, see ﬁgure 12.
The ﬁrst recession is preceded by a large drop in contribution to growth from exports, the
Figure 12: Abnormal contributions before recessions, Finland
Residential investment Other investment Exports
second by a massive drop in other investment (although not being a very deep recession
at all, seeing only two quarters of mild real GDP decline), and the remaining three by
substantial drops in residential investment. Similar explanations can be found for most
recessions in the data sample. Nevertheless, the data suggests that residential investment
should be paid particular attention to. As has been discussed above, it does stand out,
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more than other variables, as a variable with a negative impact on growth before reces-
sions, indicating that it should not be discarded as a potential key variable to gain control
of in order to obtain economic stability.
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4 Conclusion
In the thesis, I have studied the relation between two diﬀerent housing variables and
monetary policy. First, I have considered the approach inﬂation-targeting central banks
should have to house prices. I have looked at the problems of including house prices in
a price index. This is a complicated subject, as housing has the properties of both an
asset and a consumption good, due to its nature as a durable good. As of now, how dif-
ferent central banks handle house price developments in the context of inﬂation targeting
varies. Furthermore, excessive house price growth can be considered a sign of ﬁnancial
imbalances. In the past, there was disagreement on whether central banks should pay
special attention to house prices at all, as there was uncertainty on (i) whether one could
detect problematic developments in relevant variables, (ii) whether such developments
could be aﬀected by policy, and (iii) if intervening would do more good than harm. Now,
there appears to be agreement that house prices should be monitored, with an ongoing
discussion related to how they should be approached. The challenge of house prices is
thus to what extent they should be considered with respect to ﬁnancial imbalances (i.e.
as a recession indicator), and whether they should be treated on a day-to-day basis, as
part of a general business cycle indicator. I have found that a consensus has yet to be
reached on the subject, and that more research is necessary to draw a conclusion.
Moreover, I have performed an empirical analysis on the importance of residential
investment in relation to recessions. With a remarkable connection between residential
investment and the U.S. business cycle as backdrop, I have evaluated 17 other OECD
countries in a similar manner. The results show that the connection is not as strong
in general, but that residential investment remains an interesting variable for monetary
policy makers. For instance, in countries like Austria, Canada and France, there was a
clear link between residential investment and their respective business cycles. In other
countries the connection is not as consistent, but there appears to be evidence for resi-
dential investment playing an important part around certain recessions. While my results
do not aﬃrm a dominant position of residential investment as a recession indicator, they
indicate that it is of some usefulness.
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Appendix
Figure 13 illustrates the impact of using the ﬁxed capital formation deﬂator as a proxy for
residential investment. The top panels in both ﬁgures are generated based on a correct de-
ﬂator from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, whereas the bottom panels are generated using
the proxy. The impact is signiﬁcant on residential investment for the earlier recessions, as
the applied deﬂator is too big. The resulting contributions from residential investment are
overestimated in absolute value, giving larger ﬂuctuations. The problem diminishes the
closer the series gets to the base year (which is fairly late in the series). Apart from this,
the resemblance of the ﬁgures is uncanny, and the interpretation of the results would be
the same in both cases. The spill-over eﬀect on exports and other variables is completely
negligible, as illustrated by ﬁgure X. This leads to the conclusion that, although the data
produced for residential investment is somewhat inaccurate, we can nevertheless conduct
a meaningful analysis, keeping this fact in mind.
Figure 13: Impact of using deﬂator for ﬁxed capital on residential investment
Residential Investments Exports
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Table 5: Description of data collected from OECD EO9635
Abbr. Variable name Comments
CG Government ﬁnal consumption expen-
diture, value, GDP expenditure ap-
proach
This and all other variables except IHV missing be-
fore 1970 for Austria
CGV Government ﬁnal consumption expen-
diture, volume
CP Private ﬁnal consumption expenditure,
value, GDP expenditure approach
CPV Private ﬁnal consumption expenditure,
volume
GDP Gross domestic product, value, market
prices
GDPV Gross domestic product, volume, mar-
ket prices
IHV Gross ﬁxed capital formation, housing,
volume
Available from Q1 1960 for Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands.
Missing for Canada before 1961, Denmark before
1966, Germany 1991, Ireland 1990, Korea 1970,
New Zealand Q3 1961, Portugal 1970, Sweden 1963,
United Kingdom 1966.
IT Gross ﬁxed capital formation, total,
value
ITV Gross ﬁxed capital formation, total,
volume
MGS Imports of goods and services, value,
National Accounts basis
MGSV Imports of goods and services, volume,
National Accounts basis
PIT Gross total ﬁxed capital formation, de-
ﬂator
Used as proxy for capital
formation, housing, value
XGS Exports of goods and services, value,
National Accounts basis
XGSV Exports of goods and services, volume,
National Accounts basis
35All U.S. data is extracted from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Figure 14: Evolution of variable share of real GDP
Australia
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Table 6: Variable share of GDP, mean and standard deviation: Q1 1960 - Q4 1979
Country Stats Cons. Gov. exp. Res. inv. Other inv. Imports Exports
Australia mean 51,41 16,01 5,54 16,38 -6,16 10,23
sd 1,30 1,14 0,61 2,31 0,60 1,15
Austria mean 56,19 21,47 6,90 20,37 -23,23 19,49
sd 1,07 0,43 0,35 1,31 2,22 1,70
Belgium mean 56,06 26,30 9,67 14,53 -33,82 32,33
sd 1,61 1,19 1,31 1,48 6,01 5,83
Canada mean 52,29 25,03 7,38 11,66 -11,03 15,01
sd 1,04 1,03 0,54 1,26 1,88 2,13
Denmark mean 53,00 24,90 8,77 9,54 -15,94 17,20
sd 1,23 1,69 1,23 0,68 1,47 1,11
Finland mean 51,75 25,54 9,25 20,92 -17,78 13,69
sd 0,93 1,77 0,66 3,32 2,06 2,00
France mean 54,74 21,42 8,69 18,71 -9,58 9,06
sd 0,95 0,70 0,95 1,99 2,34 2,24
Germany mean n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
sd n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Ireland mean n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
sd n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Italy mean 55,67 22,35 10,66 12,01 -10,66 10,15
sd 1,62 1,13 1,96 1,72 1,97 2,77
Japan mean 61,92 17,98 7,21 19,24 -6,86 4,56
sd 1,91 3,44 1,46 2,40 1,34 1,42
Korea mean 75,37 25,51 6,01 19,06 -15,49 8,83
sd 6,73 2,96 1,64 4,81 3,18 2,93
Netherlands mean 50,54 23,74 9,22 17,05 -25,86 26,11
sd 2,30 2,27 1,23 1,36 4,64 5,11
New Zealand mean 59,96 17,59 6,53 15,68 -16,03 16,09
sd 2,34 1,30 1,06 3,58 2,37 2,26
Portugal mean 71,58 12,61 7,09 11,87 -15,66 12,45
sd 4,06 1,71 0,32 3,65 1,60 2,00
Sweden mean 53,32 30,99 10,18 15,50 -19,01 15,30
sd 1,24 1,94 1,69 2,13 1,92 2,08
United Kingdom mean 51,15 26,55 10,70 4,91 -12,98 13,98
sd 0,90 0,99 1,13 0,92 1,09 1,93
United States mean 61,12 29,62 6,52 7,33 -5,00 4,00
sd 1,38 3,08 0,76 0,79 0,83 0,67
Total mean 57,25 22,98 8,15 14,67 -15,32 14,28
sd 1,91 1,67 1,06 2,11 2,22 2,33
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Table 7: Variable share of GDP, mean and standard deviation: Q1 1980 - Q4 1999
Country Stats Cons. Gov. exp. Res. inv. Other inv. Imports Exports
Australia mean 51,83 18,23 5,67 12,97 -8,72 15,80
sd 1,27 0,56 0,63 1,21 1,66 3,50
Austria mean 57,23 21,20 6,21 19,28 -31,22 28,75
sd 1,02 0,63 0,52 1,49 3,74 3,98
Belgium mean 55,88 26,34 5,93 15,43 -49,28 49,29
sd 1,17 1,56 1,17 1,55 7,43 7,23
Canada mean 51,93 23,72 6,73 12,33 -19,94 24,68
sd 0,73 1,74 0,90 1,26 4,67 6,02
Denmark mean 48,86 26,39 4,31 12,97 -23,97 30,13
sd 1,22 1,62 0,76 2,23 3,25 4,38
Finland mean 52,15 28,31 6,84 17,07 -22,61 21,50
sd 1,16 1,26 1,14 2,87 2,97 4,79
France mean 54,17 24,42 6,48 15,57 -15,93 16,22
sd 0,74 0,71 0,98 1,24 2,50 3,13
Germany mean 59,07 18,75 6,35 16,38 -21,13 21,28
sd 0,75 0,48 0,43 1,33 2,43 2,53
Ireland mean 49,17 21,25 12,95 7,06 -53,41 46,17
sd 2,92 2,07 1,25 1,90 9,69 11,65
Italy mean 59,30 21,16 6,04 13,46 -16,33 16,93
sd 0,84 1,15 0,72 1,39 2,87 3,25
Japan mean 58,01 15,63 5,53 21,55 -8,52 8,62
sd 1,15 0,70 0,70 1,73 1,37 0,86
Korea mean 60,53 17,48 7,16 28,62 -23,34 16,94
sd 3,48 2,93 1,70 4,22 4,75 4,37
Netherlands mean 49,45 23,68 6,91 14,35 -37,48 42,50
sd 1,78 0,92 0,57 1,45 5,98 7,28
New Zealand mean 58,82 18,27 4,94 15,25 -23,20 25,81
sd 1,30 0,95 0,52 1,93 3,92 3,67
Portugal mean 64,12 17,83 7,13 14,02 -21,95 18,78
sd 1,50 1,12 0,57 2,39 6,27 3,64
Sweden mean 48,39 33,72 5,76 16,02 -24,49 24,35
sd 1,69 1,48 2,26 2,21 3,72 5,25
United Kingdom mean 57,02 22,85 10,29 5,89 -18,58 19,19
sd 3,45 2,28 1,55 2,68 3,71 3,07
United States mean 63,48 23,83 5,09 9,69 -8,43 7,14
sd 0,81 1,74 0,53 1,07 2,00 1,73
Total mean 55,52 22,39 6,68 14,88 -23,81 24,12
sd 1,50 1,33 0,94 1,90 4,05 4,46
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Table 8: Variable share of GDP, mean and standard deviation: Q1 2000 - Q4 2014
Country Stats Cons. Gov. exp. Res. inv. Other inv. Imports Exports
Australia mean 53,07 17,51 5,33 19,04 -16,85 21,44
sd 0,95 0,21 0,53 3,37 3,33 0,86
Austria mean 53,57 19,75 4,57 19,62 -45,72 48,21
sd 0,98 0,48 0,41 1,10 3,13 4,37
Belgium mean 51,61 23,95 5,53 18,22 -73,71 75,22
sd 0,89 0,44 0,34 1,22 6,33 6,10
Canada mean 54,41 20,13 6,68 15,51 -30,54 33,33
sd 2,38 0,69 0,48 1,52 2,19 2,82
Denmark mean 46,78 25,81 4,62 15,80 -41,63 48,33
sd 1,30 1,20 0,84 1,15 5,65 4,33
Finland mean 51,30 23,77 5,90 17,01 -35,72 37,82
sd 2,21 0,82 0,43 1,52 3,55 2,81
France mean 54,53 23,30 5,80 17,00 -26,64 26,09
sd 0,88 0,68 0,44 0,68 2,10 1,31
Germany mean 56,91 18,61 4,95 14,97 -33,76 38,46
sd 1,45 0,51 0,44 1,07 4,52 6,21
Ireland mean 45,16 18,29 6,90 13,72 -80,50 88,47
sd 1,28 0,68 4,05 2,18 4,89 11,62
Italy mean 59,64 19,80 5,39 15,26 -25,25 25,26
sd 0,79 0,51 0,43 1,40 1,48 2,00
Japan mean 58,36 18,64 3,23 18,33 -12,95 14,45
sd 1,00 0,67 0,61 1,40 1,10 2,18
Korea mean 52,33 13,97 4,79 27,91 -42,45 43,75
sd 2,58 0,48 1,10 1,75 6,68 9,95
Netherlands mean 46,32 24,34 5,44 15,69 -60,85 68,96
sd 2,30 1,74 0,99 0,69 5,50 7,14
New Zealand mean 60,53 16,97 4,57 19,90 -34,77 32,54
sd 1,99 0,65 0,80 1,85 3,62 0,67
Portugal mean 65,20 19,78 5,16 16,63 -37,64 30,85
sd 0,98 0,57 2,05 1,70 2,48 4,87
Sweden mean 45,68 26,92 3,38 18,87 -36,34 41,56
sd 0,95 1,38 0,45 1,06 2,71 2,82
United Kingdom mean 65,06 20,57 7,21 9,92 -31,40 28,58
sd 0,81 0,53 1,00 0,86 1,77 1,97
United States mean 67,29 19,98 4,22 12,29 -14,87 10,92
sd 0,93 0,94 1,33 0,70 0,96 1,46
Total mean 54,87 20,67 5,20 16,98 -37,87 39,68
sd 1,37 0,73 0,93 1,40 3,44 4,08
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Table 9: Contributions to percentage change in GDP, earliest available quarter - Q4 1979
Country Stats GDP Cons. Gov. Res. inv. Other inv. Imp. Exp.
Australia mean 4,03 2,22 0,65 0,54 0,50 -0,64 0,78
sd 5,83 2,11 1,23 1,67 5,05 2,95 3,58
Austria mean 3,67 2,33 0,54 0,26 0,85 -1,95 1,77
sd 2,97 1,86 0,26 0,44 3,31 2,45 2,01
Belgium mean 4,17 2,06 0,81 0,42 0,82 -2,75 2,75
sd 3,20 1,30 0,56 2,35 2,07 4,08 3,77
Canada mean 4,77 2,58 0,90 0,53 0,66 -1,45 1,42
sd 4,01 2,29 1,24 1,83 3,81 2,39 2,68
Denmark mean 3,16 1,65 1,02 0,32 0,34 -1,70 1,53
sd 3,62 2,90 0,54 3,10 2,41 3,28 2,00
Finland mean 4,18 2,34 0,73 0,40 0,74 -1,43 1,49
sd 5,83 3,41 0,30 1,16 8,73 5,04 4,48
France mean 4,80 2,56 0,86 0,54 0,72 -1,26 1,27
sd 5,10 2,03 0,30 0,98 3,81 2,15 1,97
Germany mean n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
sd n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Ireland mean n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
sd n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Italy mean 4,69 3,02 0,58 0,28 0,76 -1,16 1,39
sd 4,77 1,73 0,26 0,99 5,51 3,22 2,59
Japan mean 7,18 3,57 0,57 0,83 2,38 -0,87 1,28
sd 5,24 2,84 0,62 2,00 4,32 1,64 1,68
Korea mean 9,16 4,53 0,64 0,97 3,15 -4,07 4,10
sd 8,01 6,35 0,69 6,93 15,00 8,48 5,53
Netherlands mean 4,21 2,55 0,60 0,41 0,73 -3,09 3,04
sd 8,08 3,09 1,40 3,22 7,02 4,61 5,83
New Zealand mean 2,94 1,62 0,51 -0,05 0,54 -1,03 1,10
sd 20,66 5,77 1,28 2,25 20,16 7,96 8,35
Portugal mean 4,73 2,91 0,94 0,42 0,98 -1,09 0,80
sd 4,86 3,95 0,51 0,82 7,60 4,19 2,96
Sweden mean 3,10 1,27 0,85 0,16 0,69 -1,09 1,22
sd 2,35 1,13 0,41 1,38 3,16 1,85 1,58
United Kingdom mean 2,62 1,57 0,44 0,37 -0,05 -1,00 1,29
sd 5,71 3,83 0,89 1,91 6,48 3,50 4,45
United States mean 3,73 2,25 0,77 0,18 0,51 -0,29 0,23
sd 4,56 2,47 1,84 1,12 1,18 0,98 1,20
Total mean 4,45 2,44 0,71 0,41 0,90 -1,55 1,59
sd 5,92 2,94 0,77 2,01 6,23 3,67 3,42
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Table 10: Contributions to percentage change in GDP, earliest available quarter - Q4 1999
Country Stats GDP Cons. Gov. Res. inv. Other inv. Imp. Exp.
Australia mean 3,33 1,84 0,62 0,23 0,70 -1,19 1,02
sd 3,67 1,72 1,56 1,42 4,42 2,53 2,25
Austria mean 2,35 1,21 0,41 0,12 0,32 -1,48 1,79
sd 1,70 1,32 0,46 0,44 1,95 2,03 2,09
Belgium mean 2,08 0,90 0,30 -0,07 0,54 -2,55 2,91
sd 2,02 1,07 0,47 1,17 1,79 3,30 3,30
Canada mean 2,61 1,43 0,30 0,09 0,50 -1,88 2,05
sd 3,42 1,70 0,79 1,40 3,45 3,25 3,23
Denmark mean 2,28 0,85 0,37 0,03 0,74 -1,55 1,83
sd 3,57 2,20 0,71 1,27 3,97 2,29 2,99
Finland mean 2,68 1,29 0,38 0,05 0,59 -1,13 1,86
sd 5,18 2,29 0,79 1,27 15,67 6,23 6,25
France mean 2,20 1,19 0,49 -0,02 0,37 -1,05 1,18
sd 1,81 1,45 0,38 0,37 2,18 1,52 1,55
Germany mean 1,48 0,94 0,46 0,21 -0,04 -1,24 1,18
sd 2,88 2,50 0,87 0,89 2,28 2,06 2,50
Ireland mean 6,93 2,93 0,62 0,93 0,77 -7,76 11,02
sd 6,50 3,15 0,64 1,76 3,93 9,16 8,62
Italy mean 1,96 1,27 0,28 0,01 0,38 -0,85 0,88
sd 2,50 1,83 0,51 0,41 3,28 2,38 2,55
Japan mean 2,91 1,46 0,48 0,02 0,75 -0,36 0,57
sd 4,22 2,33 0,47 0,94 2,97 1,18 1,03
Korea mean 7,81 3,65 0,56 0,43 2,53 -2,82 3,52
sd 7,04 4,05 0,57 2,14 8,70 5,73 4,26
Netherlands mean 2,56 1,09 0,53 0,08 0,45 -2,56 3,01
sd 3,80 1,92 0,75 2,55 4,54 4,18 4,55
New Zealand mean 2,73 1,34 0,32 0,24 0,74 -1,24 1,40
sd 5,56 3,06 2,39 1,90 6,03 4,81 3,15
Portugal mean 3,08 1,97 0,62 0,35 0,76 -2,38 1,65
sd 2,85 2,21 0,55 0,82 2,86 3,04 1,84
Sweden mean 2,06 0,74 0,34 -0,18 0,53 -1,38 1,95
sd 2,63 1,47 0,56 1,25 3,16 2,07 2,58
United Kingdom mean 2,49 2,14 0,19 0,06 0,89 -1,40 1,13
sd 2,88 2,26 0,83 1,89 6,15 2,85 2,13
United States mean 3,22 2,23 0,43 0,12 0,64 -0,78 0,54
sd 3,12 1,69 0,74 0,77 1,08 1,09 0,73
Total mean 3,04 1,58 0,43 0,15 0,67 -1,87 2,19
sd 3,63 2,12 0,78 1,26 4,36 3,32 3,09
57
Table 11: Contributions to percentage change in GDP, Q1 2000 - Q4 2014
Country Stats GDP Cons. Gov. Res. inv. Other inv. Imp. Exp.
Australia mean 2,93 1,82 0,49 0,07 1,21 -1,24 0,66
sd 1,90 1,19 0,49 1,42 3,03 2,65 1,69
Austria mean 1,44 0,63 0,21 -0,05 0,25 -1,31 1,61
sd 3,54 0,76 0,90 0,23 4,04 4,18 4,91
Belgium mean 1,31 0,58 0,31 0,04 0,11 -2,19 2,36
sd 2,32 0,77 0,22 0,41 2,08 6,45 6,88
Canada mean 2,08 1,57 0,45 0,25 0,37 -0,90 0,27
sd 2,42 0,97 0,37 0,62 2,75 3,26 3,05
Denmark mean 0,67 0,50 0,32 -0,07 0,04 -1,50 1,37
sd 3,58 2,15 0,73 1,09 4,04 4,56 4,00
Finland mean 1,23 0,93 0,24 0,04 0,07 -1,14 1,00
sd 5,32 2,46 0,66 0,73 6,14 4,94 9,33
France mean 1,11 0,73 0,37 -0,01 0,17 -0,81 0,65
sd 2,05 0,94 0,20 0,32 1,93 2,06 2,07
Germany mean 1,07 0,41 0,20 -0,03 0,00 -1,37 1,85
sd 3,66 1,39 0,49 0,50 3,04 3,24 4,21
Ireland mean 2,46 0,87 0,35 -0,52 0,84 -3,20 5,38
sd 7,84 2,42 1,14 1,84 9,07 10,38 10,98
Italy mean 0,02 -0,02 0,09 -0,04 -0,17 -0,23 0,39
sd 2,90 1,39 0,74 0,43 2,10 2,50 2,70
Japan mean 0,74 0,47 0,30 -0,09 -0,08 -0,41 0,53
sd 4,55 2,46 0,43 0,52 2,16 1,91 3,09
Korea mean 4,00 1,60 0,59 0,12 0,68 -2,34 3,42
sd 3,77 2,24 0,49 1,02 6,48 7,69 4,95
Netherlands mean 1,08 0,11 0,53 -0,12 0,11 -2,01 2,46
sd 2,75 1,12 1,07 0,73 2,57 4,01 4,54
New Zealand mean 2,44 1,86 0,44 0,04 0,72 -1,32 0,82
sd 3,50 2,22 0,71 1,16 4,98 4,02 2,84
Portugal mean 0,18 0,10 0,08 -0,43 -0,24 -0,45 1,12
sd 3,11 2,31 0,57 0,86 3,09 4,30 2,99
Sweden mean 2,05 0,98 0,28 0,18 0,40 -1,24 1,48
sd 4,07 1,28 0,35 0,53 3,15 4,15 4,80
United Kingdom mean 1,77 1,14 0,41 0,14 0,17 -0,73 0,69
sd 2,68 1,73 0,84 3,87 4,43 3,50 3,91
United States mean 1,89 1,48 0,20 -0,07 0,25 -0,45 0,43
sd 2,65 1,29 0,62 0,65 1,07 1,42 1,09
Total mean 1,58 0,87 0,33 -0,03 0,27 -1,27 1,47
sd 3,48 1,62 0,61 0,94 3,68 4,18 4,34
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Figure 15: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Australia
Timeline with recessions
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Figure 16: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Austria
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Figure 16: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Austria
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Figure 17: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Belgium
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Figure 17: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Belgium
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Figure 18: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Canada
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Figure 18: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Canada
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Figure 19: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Denmark
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Figure 19: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Denmark
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Figure 20: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Finland
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Figure 20: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Finland
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Figure 21: Cumulative abnormal contributions, France
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Figure 21: Cumulative abnormal contributions, France
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Figure 22: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Germany
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Figure 22: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Germany
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Figure 23: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Ireland
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Figure 23: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Ireland
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Figure 24: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Italy
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Figure 24: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Italy
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Figure 25: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Japan
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Figure 25: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Japan
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Figure 26: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Korea
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Figure 26: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Korea
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Figure 27: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Netherlands
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Figure 27: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Netherlands
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Figure 28: Cumulative abnormal contributions, New Zealand
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Figure 28: Cumulative abnormal contributions, New Zealand
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Figure 29: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Portugal
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Figure 29: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Portugal
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Figure 30: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Sweden
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Figure 30: Cumulative abnormal contributions, Sweden
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Figure 31: Cumulative abnormal contributions, United Kingdom
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Figure 31: Cumulative abnormal contributions, United Kingdom
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Figure 32: Cumulative abnormal contributions, United States
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Figure 32: Cumulative abnormal contributions, United States
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